Monetary policy strategies : a central bank panel by Mervyn A. King
Speakers at Jackson Hole normally draw out the lessons of economic
theory for a particular area of economic policy. But this year we are
doing the reverse. We are trying to distill lessons from the practice of
monetary policy in the United States—over an extraordinarily success-
ful quarter century under the leadership of Alan Greenspan—for the
theory of monetary policy.
I want to describe the three important lessons that I have learned
from Alan during my time at the Bank of England. 
First, to be a successful central banker requires an extraordinary
degree of objectivity, something which is not always easy to maintain.
The key is to recognize that economics tells you how to think, not
what to think. Economics is not a set of settled conclusions. Above
all, it is vital never to confuse the world with a model. The whole
point of a model is to abstract from a wide range of factors in order
to think clearly about one particular issue.  
Let me describe an example of what I shall call “the Greenspan
approach to economics.” It concerns the “Lucas critique.” Robert
Lucas’ 1976 paper encouraged economists to construct models,
which incorporated explicit optimizing behavior by households and
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lessons from their models as literally as the enthusiasts of the engi-
neering approach to macroeconomic policy had done in the 1950s
and 1960s. The Greenspan approach to economics would advise
great caution. The insight of the Lucas critique is that we need to
think about the responses of rational households and firms when
analyzing the consequences of alternative policies. But the likelihood
that any particular model captures how the real economy would
respond to a given change in policy is vanishingly small. 
The second lesson is that empirical knowledge is not confined to
the econometric analysis of official statistics. There are other and
often crucially important pieces of information that come to us in
more qualitative form. These include information from businesses
about what they see happening in the economy. Perhaps the most
famous example of this in recent years is the productivity acceleration
in the United States in the mid-1990s. The extensively revised official
U.S. data now show that productivity began accelerating in 1995.
However, that was not visible until the vintages released in 1998. But
as Alan Blinder and Ricardo Reiss have reminded us at this confer-
ence, Chairman Greenspan did not wait until 1998 to conclude that
the underlying rate of productivity growth might be increasing. The
key reason was that he talked with, and listened to, people who work
in business. Already in May 1996, when the Fed’s model was forecast-
ing increasing inflationary pressures going forward, Alan said “it is
very difficult to take the existing structure of the NAIRUs, capacity
limits, and the usual potential analysis that we do and square it in any
measurable way with what we sense from anecdotal reports.”1
In the United Kingdom, by contrast, there does not seem to have
been a productivity miracle. But we have had many examples of the
importance of qualitative data in making judgments. For instance,
over the past year or so, significant migration of labor from eastern
Europe has expanded the United Kingdom’s potential labor force. By
its nature, such flows are not accurately reflected in official data. But
the Bank of England’s business contacts were able to tell us that the
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 ability to recruit new migrant workers was a growing and significant
response to a tight labor market.
The third lesson is that it is the consistency over time of a policy
framework that sustains a market economy, as the achievements of the
United States over the last 200 years show very clearly. Alan, of course,
has stressed this in the context of price stability. But it applies equally
well to the system of taxes, property rights, and public goods provision
on which prosperity in a market economy relies. Alan famously defined
price stability in the following terms: “price stability is best thought of
as an environment in which inflation is so low and stable over time that
it does not materially enter into the decisions of households and
firms.”2 I would suggest that implicit in this is a prescription that Alan
might write for all economic policies, not just monetary policy.
Namely, that economic policy stability is best thought of as an environ-
ment in which the decisions of households and firms are not materially
affected by the need to insure against future arbitrary or mischievous
changes in government policy. 
In the last decade, we have had a debate about whether price 
stability should be implemented by quantitative targets or not. In
monetary policy we have seen the spread of “inflation targets,” and
targets have begun to permeate other areas of economic policy, too. You
will not be surprised to learn that I think that such numerical targets
do have a role—and I share the views of Lars Svensson and Michael
Woodford expressed earlier about the importance of transparency and
the source of new ideas on that subject. But the question of whether
numerical targets are appropriate or not concerns the political economy
of how to ensure the transparency of policy, the accountability of those
responsible for it, and the way in which households and firms form
expectations of policy—monetary, fiscal, or other. Since the political
economy varies from one country to another, so will the appropriate
method of achieving price stability in particular and economic policy
stability in general. The crucial and overriding point is that a market
economy cannot flourish if policymakers behave in ways that lead
private agents to expect future economic policies—be those future
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 monetary, fiscal, or legal policies—to be subject to arbitrary or capri-
cious changes. 
Of course, an expectation of a stable regime rarely will translate into
stable outcomes, and it would be irresponsible of policymakers to let
such a misconception take hold. A well-designed set of institutions
will lead to responses being predictable, but it cannot guarantee that
outcomes will be.
And there is a pressing issue here. In the United States, inflation has
been both low and rather stable. Over the past decade, it has varied
between 1.0 percent and 3.8 percent, so with some justification we
can say that inflation no longer “materially enter[s] into the decisions
of households and firms.” In the United Kingdom, inflation has been
even more stable. But this success carries a risk for the future. Infla-
tion expectations may be sensitive to a large but temporary shock that
moves inflation outside the range within which it has remained for
some years. With their belief in stability jolted, households’ inflation
expectations might move by much more than was justified by the
temporary nature of the shock. That would make it more difficult for
the central bank to bring inflation back to target. The moral of this
particular story is that it may be risky to infer from the observation
that inflation expectations are stable that all is well. There will be
times when large and persistent shocks occur, and it would be unwise
to count on inflation expectations remaining stable when actual infla-
tion starts to deviate substantially from its recent range. 
So, those are the three lessons that I have learned from Alan: (1) a
recognition that economics is not a set of doctrines but a way of
thinking; (2) the importance of using qualitative and quantitative
information from a range of sources; and (3) there are a small number
of fundamental objectives that are crucial and which we can judge by
the Greenspan yardstick of whether we have freed businesses and
households from the burden of expending resources to deal with
unnecessary policy volatility. 
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 Alan’s departure from the central banking scene will deprive us of
a source of wisdom, inspiration, and leadership. To be sure, his
words, whether spoken or written, will still reach us from the 
sidelines. To use a tennis analogy, I see Alan in the future as the
central banking equivalent of the captain of a Davis Cup team, not
actually playing but encouraging the younger and less talented
members, and stressing the importance of footwork, timing, and
getting into position early—otherwise known as preemption, good
judgment, and careful analysis.
Alan, thank you for raising the respect which others give to our
discipline of economics and our profession of central banking.    
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 Endnotes
1 Transcript of FOMC meeting on May 21, 1996.
2Transparency in monetary policy. At the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis,
Economic Policy Conference, St. Louis, Mo., Oct. 11, 2001. This definition was
set out much earlier, in similar terms, in Alan Greenspan’s statement before the
FOMC on “Ways and Means,” U.S. House of Representatives, Jan. 25, 1990.
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